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Abstract 
We propose a new microeconomic explanation for the divergent experiences of economies 
in forming human capital. We suggest that the positive effect of a longer life expectancy on 
human capital formation arises from two separate effects: a life-expectancy effect and a 
prolonged intergenerational overlap effect. We argue that the duration of the overlap 
between generations and the associated parental support can affect the marginal cost of 
human capital formation and hence its level: parental support is cheaper than market 
financing. We thus attribute the strong correlation between the formation of human capital 
and life expectancy not merely to a higher marginal benefit arising from a longer payback 
period but also to a lower marginal cost arising from a prolonged intergenerational overlap. 
We provide conditions under which a longer overlap results in a higher level of per-capita 
output. 
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1. The idea 
 
It is well recognized that the stock of human capital affects the level of per-capita output in 
an economy. Whether the effect arises because human capital is an ordinary input in the 
economy’s production function or because the effect manifests itself through the 
enhancement of total factor productivity (in that it leads to the creation, adoption, 
implementation, and diffusion of new technologies) are largely empirical issues. The notion 
that an economy that forms a large quantity of human capital will have a higher per-capita 
output than an economy that forms a small quantity of human capital can safely be taken as 
given, requiring little, if any, additional inquiry. But why is it that one economy has, or forms, 
abundant per-capita human capital, while another has, or forms, little? Why does the per-
capita human capital gap between economies not close? Much – though not all – of the 
human capital in an economy is the result of decisions made by individuals. Clearly, several 
factors are involved and one of them is life expectancy: a longer life expectancy entails a 
longer payback period that, in turn, encourages larger investments in human capital. An 
economy consisting of individuals with a long life expectancy will then form more human 
capital than an economy consisting of individuals with a short life span. 
 
 The impact of a lengthened life expectancy comes from the returns side of the human 
capital investment calculus: the marginal benefit is higher. We argue however, that typically, 
a lowered marginal cost of forming human capital is imbedded in a lengthened life 
expectancy. We seek to unearth this effect and study its role in accounting for the divergent 
experiences of economies in the formation of human capital. We suggest that the lowered 
marginal cost effect arises from a correlate of extended life expectancy: prolonged duration 
of the overlap between generations. Suppose that as long as they are alive, parents support the 
human capital formation of their children, and that the parental support is cheaper than 
market financing.1 An extended life expectancy that results in a prolonged overlap entails 
more parental support, which in turn can foster the formation of more human capital. An 
example will serve to illustrate. 
 
 Suppose that life expectancy is 45. An individual gives birth to one child when the 
individual is 20 years of age. The child is cared for in his infancy and for as long as he 
                                                          
1 We Assume that the technology of human capital formation is invariant to the method of financing; the edge of 
parental support over market financing arises not from parents’ direct involvement in the formation of human 
capital by their children, but from the intergenerational transfer constituting a means of financing human 
capital acquisition that is less expensive than the market-based means of financing. 
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engages in acquiring human capital, conditional on the individual being alive.  The age at 
which the child makes the human capital formation decision is 15.  At this age, if the child 
were to engage in human capital formation, the child could expect parental support for up to 
10 years. If the child finds it optimal to devote more than 10 years to human capital formation, 
he can do so by borrowing at a fixed market interest rate. When the child reaches the age of 
20, he gives birth to a child whom he, in turn, will support in the same manner in which he 
was supported. Suppose that the child finds it optimal to acquire human capital for a little 
more than 10 years, say for τ  years in excess of 10. During these years the child has to bear 
the entire cost of forming human capital, which includes the market rate of interest. 
 
 Suppose now that life expectancy is 55. Retaining all other assumptions as before, the 
child can now expect parental support for up to 20 years. To see the implications of this 
assumption for human capital formation, consider the case 0 10<τ< . All of the years of 
human capital formation previously financed by commercial loans now become parentally 
supported, interest-free years. Since the marginal cost of forming human capital goes down, 
more human capital will be formed. This effect is separate from the returns to human capital, 
a marginal benefit that arises from the addition of years during which returns to the human 
capital investment can be reaped.2 
 
 In section 2 we present our analytical framework.  In section 3 we formally investigate 
the effect of extended overlapping on the formation of human capital by optimizing 
individuals. To this end we decompose the “gross” life-expectancy effect into a “net” life-
expectancy effect and an overlapping effect. In section 4 we trace the welfare implication of 
extended overlapping for an economy that is subjected to such a change. In section 5 we 
further explain the rationale underlying our idea and offer a suggestion as to how to 
differentiate empirically between the overlapping model of human capital formation and the 
received model of human capital formation. 
 
                                                          
2  To a child at the age of 15, the expected overlap with a parent whose age is 35 is best given by the 
contemporaneous life expectancy of adults at the age of 35 rather than by the life expectancy of the parental 
generation at birth. Life expectancy at birth is quite sensitive to the incidence of children dying at very early 
ages. Historically, life expectancy was increased through reductions in the number of children dying during 
infancy and the sharp increases in life expectancy at birth were not followed by corresponding increases in 
longevity, although the two measures were positively correlated. Since in this paper our interest is in the 
effect of changes in the life span of adults, that is, in changes in the mean age of death beyond infancy, our 
reference to life expectancy in the sections that follow should be understood as life expectancy net of the 
effect of infant mortality. 
 2 
 
 
2. The analytical framework 
  
 Consider a continuous overlapping-generations economy. At every instant of time a 
generation is born. A generation consists of a continuum of individuals of measure N. The 
lifespan of an individual is l.  The individual gives birth to a child after time spell l  (0< l <l) 
has elapsed. Thus, each member of generation t has a single parent in generation t- l , and a 
single offspring in generation t+ l . At each point in time the economy consists, therefore, of 
a continuum of overlapping generations, each at an age between 0 and l. The economy’s 
population size is thus a constant of measure Nl. 
c c
c
c
 
 During their lifetime, individuals form human capital, work, and procreate. Let an 
individual spend a portion of his lifetime immediately following birth forming human capital 
and the complementary portion of his lifetime working. While the acquisition of human 
capital is costly, as it entails the opportunity cost of forgone wage earnings, it subsequently 
enhances the individual’s productivity, and hence his earnings. Since an individual gives birth 
to a child after l (≥0) of his lifespan has elapsed, l  measures the duration of the 
overlap between the individual and his child.
c cp ll −≡
3, 4  
 
 Let s  represent the time span that an individual of generation t chooses to allocate to 
human capital formation. Hence the remaining
t
tsl − of the individual’s lifespan is allocated to 
work. Let the cost of forming human capital be a proportion λ  of the individual’s wage. The 
cost of forming human capital is born by the individual’s parent as long as the parent is alive, 
and by the individual himself through borrowing at the market interest rate if additional 
human capital is formed past the parent’s death.5 When the individual reaches the age l , he 
has a child of his own. That child too is faced with a choice of allocating his lifetime between 
human capital formation and work, drawing on his parent’s support in a manner akin to that 
c
                                                          
3  Alternatively, it can be assumed that the individual gives birth to a child at a younger age and that the child 
reaches the human capital formation age only at a point in time that is  into the individual’s life. The years 
prior to that point in time are immaterial since they do not affect the child’s human capital formation decision. 
cl
 
4  Since our aim is to unravel the pure effect of alternative durations of overlapping on human capital formation, 
we consider the timing of giving birth, , as exogenously given. cl
 
5  Our interest in this paper is in human capital formation. We concentrate on the effect of inter vivos transfers 
on human capital formation and we exclude bequests. While the bequests that individuals receive undoubtedly 
affect their well being, ordinarily bequests are received at a point in time in individuals’ life that is long past 
their human capital formation years. 
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described above, that is, up to a duration of l .  The amount of human capital (measured in 
efficiency units of labor) that is available to the individual and supplied by him inelastically, 
generated by the allocation of time s  to human capital formation, is given by 
p
t )( tsϕ  where 
.0lim and,)(lim);,0(for 0('',0)(',1)(;1)0(
0
)( =′) ∞=′∈<>>= →→ lststtt slsss tt tsts ϕϕϕϕϕϕ   
)(
),min( )
),
)()( λτλτϕ τττττ edwedwseV
pc
cp
lslt
lt
tlt
st
st
lst
ttr
t ∫∫ ∫ ′+++++ ++ −−− −−=
s′
.maxt
s
s =
(ττr −−
min(
arg
τr−
tV
[ ])pl()()( )( ttlt st stsrrt sswedwes t tttst −+′ ∫ ++ +×−− + λδϕϕ ττ
0)( =x
t−τ =τ
δ 0<x 1)( =xδ 0>x 1)0(0 ≤≤ δ
 Let rt and wt be the instantaneous interest rate and the instantaneous wage rate at time t, 
respectively. The lifetime income (in present value terms) of a generation t individual who 
chooses to invest s time in human capital formation, recalling the method of financing 
described above, is  
,ττ dw
 
where  is the duration of the human capital formation period chosen by the individual’s 
child. Without loss of generality,6 we assume that the individual seeks to maximize his 
lifetime income, that is,  
       (1) 
Hence, the optimal human capital formation span for an individual of generation t is 
implicitly given by the first-order condition 
   (2) 
where   for ,  for ,  and . 
 
 We now describe briefly the economy.  We have in mind a small economy that operates 
in a perfectly competitive world in which economic activity extends over an infinite 
continuous time.  At every point in time the economy produces a single consumption good 
using perfectly durable capital and labor measured in efficiency units in the production 
process.  The supply of capital at each point of time consists of the output that was not 
consumed in addition to net international borrowing. Capital is perfectly mobile across 
countries and the rate of return to capital is at a stationary positive level, r , in terms of the 
                                                          
6 In a more general setting in which the individual maximizes his lifetime utility ∫  subject 
to the budget constraint ∫ , where 
ττ
+ −τβ− dcuelt
t
t )()(
t
lt
t
tr Vdce ≤ττ
+ −τ− τ )( )(⋅u  is the instantaneous utility function, c  is 
consumption at time τ, and β is the discount rate, it is rather straightforward to show that under a constant 
interest rate and perfectly competitive markets, assumptions to which we resort subsequently, the individual’s 
indirect utility is strictly increasing in his lifetime income V . 
τ
t
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consumption good.  The supply of labor at each point of time is the sum of the aggregate 
supply of human-capital-augmented labor of all the generations. Production at each point of 
time occurs according to a constant returns to scale production function which is invariant 
across time. Therefore, the output produced at time t, Yt, is  
 
 );(),( ttttt kfLLKFY ≡=  ,/ ttt LKk =  (3) 
 
where Kt and Lt =  are the capital and labor employed at time t, respectively. 
The production function  is strictly increasing and strictly concave.  Producers operate 
in a perfectly competitive environment. Profit maximization gives rise to the following first-
order conditions 
∫ ≤+τ ττ τϕts Nds )(
)(kf
 )( tt kfr ′= ; (4) 
              ttt kkfkfw )()( ′−= , (5) 
 
where rt and wt are the interest rate and wage rate at time t, respectively, and output is the 
numeraire. Given the unrestricted nature of the international capital markets, the economy’s 
interest rate is exogenously given at the world level r , at all times. Consequently, the capital-
labor ratio employed in production is stationary at a level k , 
 ),r(fk 1−′=  (6) 
 
and the wage rate is stationary at a level w , 
 
 kkfkfw )()( ′−= . (7) 
 
 Since the economic environment in which the individual optimizes is stationary, we can 
ignore time subscripts and rewrite (2) as 
 
 [ ] ).()()(11 )( pslr ls sse
r
−δλ+ϕ=ϕ′− −−  (8) 
 
The left-hand side of (8), multiplied by w , measures the marginal benefit of human capital 
formation. The right-hand side of (8), multiplied by w , measures the marginal cost of human 
capital formation, which has two components. The first component is the usual opportunity 
cost of forgone earnings and the second component reflects the impact of the overlap between 
parents and children. When the duration of the period of human capital formation chosen by 
the individual is shorter than the duration of the overlap, ; the entire cost of 
human capital formation is born by the individual’s parent and the second component 
0)( =− plsδ
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vanishes. However, when the individual chooses to form human capital for a time span that is 
longer than the duration of the overlap with his parent,  the marginal cost of 
forming human capital incorporates the extra cost of financing human capital formation 
through the marketplace. Given the assumptions concerning the production function of 
human capital, the solution (8), and the solution to the individual’s maximization problem in 
(1), is unique and interior (that is, the length of time allocated to human capital formation 
maintains ).
;1)( =− plsδ
p
),0(s t l∈
p
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3. The effect of an extended intergenerational overlap on human capital 
formation 
 
 Although in this paper we are interested in investigating the consequences of the 
duration of the overlap between parents and children as measured by l , typically an increase 
in l  arises from the prolongation of life expectancy l. Therefore, a change in l affects the 
endogenous variables through two channels: changing the life expectancy, and varying the 
duration of the overlap between parents and children. We are able though to separate the 
effects of a change in l on the investment in human capital that arises from these two 
channels. While there are many interesting models that focus on the link between human 
capital formation and life expectancy (recent examples include Stark, 1999, chapter 2; 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil, 2000; and Leung and Wang, 2003), our investigation of the 
overlapping-duration channel is novel. 
p
 
 Suppose that there is an increase in l. The left-hand side of (8), as a function of s, shifts 
upward: the conventional life-expectancy channel is at work.  As a result of the increase in l, 
individuals live longer and hence are able to reap the returns to human capital formation over 
a longer period, raising the marginal benefit of human capital formation. But the increase in l 
also increases l  by the same amount (keeping l  constant), which in turn affects the 
marginal cost of human capital in the right-hand side of (8) in a more subtle way. The right-
hand side of (8), as a function of s, is a smooth function except for a vertical jump that occurs 
at . Upon an increase in l , the jump in the marginal cost function occurs at a later 
point in time, thereby extending the range within which the marginal cost of human capital 
formation is low. This is due to the overlapping-duration channel: a larger l  implies a 
c
pls = p
p
                                                          
7 The second-order condition for a maximum holds: [ ] [ ] 0)(1)(11 )()( <′+−′′− −−−− sese .
r
slrslr ϕϕ  
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longer overlap between parents and children, which in turn allows children to enjoy parental 
support for forming human capital for a longer period of time. To the extent that the extra 
parental support lowers the cost of forming human capital at the margin, the overlapping-
duration channel is operative as it encourages additional human capital formation that would 
not have been possible had the intergenerational overlap remained the same. In short, while 
the life-expectancy channel operates from the benefit side, the overlapping-duration channel 
operates from the cost side. The following figures illustrate circumstances in which the 
overlapping-duration channel is fully operative. 
 
 Suppose that l rises from l  to , and hence l  rises from to . Figure 1 shows that 
individuals initially choose s  for engaging in human capital formation so that their 
entire investment is paid for by the parents and no market finance takes place. Following the 
increase of l from l
1
*
1 <
2l
p pl1
pl2
pl1
1  to , the marginal benefit curve shifts up due to the life-expectancy 
effect, and the marginal cost curve extends the range  (the darkened segment between  and  
2l
pl1
pl2
s*2
2l
s*1
) within which human capital formation is family financed (the overlapping-duration 
effect). Consequently, individuals choose s . Had the cost structure of human capital 
formation been the same as before (that is, without the overlapping-duration effect), the life-
expectancy effect alone would have resulted in a duration of human capital formation equal 
to , which is less than s . Hence the additional period of human capital formation of 
 can be attributed to the pure effect of the overlapping duration. In Figure 2, 
individuals initially choose s  for human capital formation so that the constraint of 
parental supported human capital formation just binds. Following an increase of l from l  to 
, and of l  from l  to l , individuals choose l . In this case the life-expectancy effect 
results in a duration of human capital formation that is equal to only , and the overlapping-
duration effect contributes to the additional increase of l  in the duration of human 
capital formation. Similarly, Figure 3 illustrates the case in which individuals initially choose 
, relying on market financing above and beyond the overlapping period with their 
parents. Following the increases in l and l , they choose , wherein the overlapping-
duration effect again contributes to the additional increase of l  in the duration of 
human capital formation.  
*
2
p
pl1
l−
l>
*
2
p
2
p
1
p
1
pl1
*
1 =
1
p p
1
p
2
'
2s
p −
'
22 s
p −
pl2
'
22 s
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 Having provided a non-exhaustive list of cases in which the overlapping-duration 
channel is operative in human capital formation decisions, we should add that, of course, the 
overlapping-duration channel is not always operative. Nonetheless, the combined effect of 
the life-expectancy channel and the overlapping-duration channel is always positive. 
 
 Proposition 1: An increase in l will always lead to an increase in human capital 
formation, that is, 0>∂
∂
l
s .  
 
 Proof: See appendix. 
 
 Our argument so far amounts to a statement that the positive effect of a longer life 
expectancy on human capital formation arises from two distinct effects: a pure life-
expectancy effect and a prolonged intergenerational overlapping effect. Yet decomposing an 
effect into its constituent parts falls short of demonstrating that each part has a life of its own.  
Thus, we next investigate the pure overlapping-duration effect, studying its role in isolation 
from, and independently of, the conventional life-expectancy effect. 
 
 Suppose that individuals give birth to their children at a somewhat earlier age while 
their life expectancy remains intact. This change entails an increase in l  that is not 
associated with a change in l.  While, by construction, the left-hand side of (8) remains 
unaltered so that the life-expectancy channel is not operative, the change in l  affects the 
right-hand side of (8) through the overlapping-duration channel. To illustrate the pure effect 
of the overlapping duration on human capital formation, suppose that l  increases from l  
to  (keeping l constant). To facilitate comparison we consider once again three cases 
wherein the initial choice of the duration of the human capital formation span is less than, 
equal to, or greater than the duration of overlap. In Figure 4, individuals initially choose to 
form human capital for a period that is shorter than the duration of the overlap with their 
parents, . In this case a prolonged overlapping has no impact on the individuals’ 
decision as to how much human capital to form. In Figure 5, the initial decision is to set the 
period of human capital formation equal to the duration of the overlap, that is, s . In this 
case, the marginal benefit curve intersects the vertical portion of the marginal cost curve,
p
p
*
1
p p
1
pl2
pls 1
*
1 <
pl1=
 and 
the extended overlap has a clear and positive effect – it increases the individuals’ human  
 9 
 
 
    [ ] )('11 )( se
r
slr ϕ−−−  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    marginal benefit;
marginal cost  
             1 
   0   s  l   l            l  s *1
p
1
p
2
    Figure 4 
        
        [ ] )('1 )( se
r
slr ϕ−−−1  
 
              1 
   0    l   lp1
*
2s
p
2              l s 
marginal benefit;
marginal cost 
    Figure 5 
     
     [ ] )('11 )( se
r
slr ϕ−−−  
 
            1 
   0                   l s pp lssl 2
*
2
*
11
marginal benefit;
marginal cost 
    Figure 6 
 10 
capital formation period to s .*2
8 Lastly, Figure 6 presents the case where individuals initially 
choose a duration of human capital formation, s , that exceeds the duration of the 
overlap with their parents. The extended overlap prompts additional human capital 
formation, provided that the increase in the duration of the overlap is large enough (that is, as 
large as l > ). We summarize these results on the pure effect of overlapping in the 
following proposition. 
*
1
p
2
*
1s
 
 Proposition 2: An increase in l  from  to l  without any change in l leads to a strict 
increase in human capital formation by an individual, that is, s , if s  or if 
. 
p pl1
p
2
*
1
*
2 s> pl1*1 =
pp lsl 2
*
11 <<
 
4. The welfare effect of an extended intergenerational overlap 
 
 We have shown that the duration of the intergenerational overlap of individuals with 
their parents can impact positively on an individual’s formation of human capital. This 
channel of influence is independent from the usual repercussion of the life-expectancy 
channel.  
 
 To analyze the welfare effect of an extended overlap both when it operates in 
conjunction with the life-expectancy effect and when it operates independently of the life-
expectancy effect, we first calculate the flow of per-capita output. Since at any given point in 
time the economy’s labor input measured in efficiency units is 
, the economy-wide output (given (6)) is NsslNdsL
st
lt
)()()( ϕτϕ −== ∫ −− )(kLf=Y , and 
population size is Nl, per-capita output is: 
 
l
kfssl
Nl
Yy )()()( ϕ−== . (9) 
 
Measuring welfare by the flow of per-capita output in (9), we present our results regarding 
the welfare implication of an extended intergenerational overlap in the two cases, that is, with 
and without a simultaneous change in life expectancy, in the following proposition.   
                                                          
8  We exclude from consideration the exceptional case in which the marginal benefit curve intersects the 
marginal cost curve at the lower corner of its vertical portion. In other words, when , we assume that s 
solves (8) with a δ (0) > 0. 
pls =
 11 
 
 
 
 Proposition 3: (i) For a given ∆ >0, pll ∆= y∆ >0 holds; and (ii) for a given ∆ >0 but 
, ∆ >0 holds as long as ∆ >0. In both cases, 
pl
0=∆l y s y∆ is larger the larger is ∆ . s
 
 Proof: (i) It suffices to show that 0>∆y  for any small increase of  in both l and l . 
Total differentiation of (9) yields 
l∆ p
[ ]
[ ] .∆)(∆)()()()(
)(∆)()()∆(')()()∆∆( 2


 +−−=
−−−+−=∆
l
lsssss'sl
l
kf
kf
l
lssllssslssly
ϕϕϕ
ϕϕϕ
 
Since ∫∫ −−>⋅ ls strls dtedt )(1 , or [ ]l  (assuming a positive interest rate )(11 slrers −−−>− r ), 
it follows from (8) that ( 0)()(') >ϕ−ϕ− sssl . Since 0>∆s  from Proposition 1, it follows 
that ∆ .   0>y
 (ii) Since l is constant in this case, denoting s  and differentiating both sides of 
(9) with respect to , we have  
)( pls≡
pl
[ ] )(')()(')()( pp lssssll
kf
ld
yd ϕ−ϕ−= . 
Hence, for a given , we obtain  0>∆ pl
[ ] [ ]∫∫ ∆+∆+ ϕ−ϕ−=ϕ−ϕ−=∆ ss s pll l p dssssllkfdllssssllkfy
pp
p .)()(')(
)()(')()(')()(  
Again, since it follows from (8) that ( 0)()(') >ϕ−ϕ− sssl , it is clear that ∆  as long as 
. 
0>y
0>∆s
 In both cases, it is easy to see from the expressions of y∆  that the larger the increase in 
s that arises from a given increase in l or l , the larger the increase in y.        p
 
 When an extended overlap, resulting from prolonged life expectancy, brings about 
additional human capital formation as illustrated in Figures 1-3, it also raises the per-capita 
output at any point in time. Similarly, when an extended overlapping that is not accompanied 
by a change in life expectancy induces additional human capital formation as illustrated in 
Figures 5 and 6, it also raises the per-capita output at any point in time. Therefore, whenever 
the overlapping-duration channel is operative, either in conjunction with the life-expectancy 
effect or independently of it, an increase in the intergenerational overlap is welfare improving. 
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By the same token, a shortening of the overlap between parents and their children can have 
an adverse impact on human capital formation, and hence on welfare. 
 
 Corollary: Consider two identical economies in which the overlapping-duration channel 
is operative. The economy that experiences an increase in the duration of the overlap will 
enjoy a higher per-capita output than the economy in which the duration of the overlap 
remains unchanged.   
 
5. Complementary reflections 
 
 In a highly stylized economy in which material capital is the only production input, the 
production function is concave, and the cost of acquiring capital is linear, a lengthening of the 
lifespan of capital prompts the optimal acquisition of more capital. The pioneers some four 
decades ago of the modern theory of human capital, notably Jacob Mincer, Theodore W. 
Schultz, and Gary S. Becker, were duly aware of the powerful analogy between the effect of 
the lifespan of material capital and the effect of longevity, as a proxy of the length of the 
period during which human capital renders a return. Yet, while the acquisition of more 
material capital (machinery) today in response to a lengthened lifespan would presumably 
crowd out the acquisition of material capital tomorrow, a lengthened life expectancy could 
crowd in human capital formation by the next generation. Here, the direct analogy between 
the two types of capital apparently breaks down. 
 
 The positive effect on human capital formation of overlapping with a parent arises from 
the parent’s provision of support for the child’s formation of human capital. In the absence of 
any reverse transfer from the child to the parent, the motive for the parental support is 
altruism. In this paper we assume parental altruism within dynasties rather than explain why 
and how it evolves – an issue that we address in related work (Falk and Stark, 2001).9, 10  
 
 While the assumption that the parent provides somewhat less than full support in the 
child’s pursuit of human capital will affect the absolute size of the effects in our model, it will 
not change its qualitative predictions. 
 
                                                          
9  The extended overlap is tantamount to enhanced altruism, an effect studied in Stark, 1999 chapter 1.  There, as 
here, the effect on the child’s wellbeing is positive. 
 
10 We further assume that parental altruism takes the form of sharing a meal, not imposing a will; parents do not 
decide for their children how much human capital the children should form. 
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 A widely held view maintains that in developing economies, delayed marriage and 
postponed childbearing will hasten the pace of economic development and entail a higher 
per-capita output. The rationale is that as a consequence of delay and postponement, the 
denominator in the output per capita ratio will be smaller, and the nominator will be larger 
since adults (young women) will be spending more of their productive time working in the 
economy rather than tending to home production (rearing children). Yet if the economic 
environment in which such changes occur is characterized by a fixed (or little-changed) life 
expectancy, the intergenerational overlap will be reduced, possibly impinging negatively on 
human capital formation (Proposition 2), and on welfare (Proposition 3). 
 
 To discriminate between the received model of human capital formation and the 
overlapping model, consider a setting in which the life expectancy of the individual’s parent 
is rising (the intergenerational overlap is lengthened) and the individual’s life expectancy is 
declining, yet the individual invests more in human capital formation. Such an outcome can 
only arise from the operation of the overlapping effect since the individual’s negative life-
expectancy effect (the shortened duration of the payback period to an investment in human 
capital) implies a reduced investment in human capital. The same discriminating test applies 
if the life expectancy of the individual’s parent is rising, and the individual’s life expectancy 
remains unchanged. 
 
 One possibility for assessing empirically the distinct effect of the intergenerational 
overlap on human capital formation is to examine the age of home leaving and to explore 
whether this age correlates positively with schooling. A study of the long-term trend in the 
age of home leaving in the United States (Gutmann, Pullum-Piñon and Pullum, 2001) 
provides illuminating evidence. The study asks whether young people aged 15-29 were living 
with one or both of their parents at the time of each of the decennial censuses from 1880 
through 1990. The study finds that, with the exception of the Second World War era (and in 
contrast to widely-held views), the age of leaving home rose in twentieth century America. 
The study further suggests that a reason for leaving home early is the death of the parents and 
it points out that over the century, there was a dramatic decline in the likelihood of becoming 
an orphan between the ages of 15 to 29, a change brought about by the steady decline in adult 
mortality. In addition, the study highlights the sharply increased likelihood of attendance of 
high school by those aged 15-19, “and with it the likelihood that they would live at home” (p. 
10). Thus, the long-term trends that the study depicts are that the age at which young people 
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ceased to live with their parents rose, adult mortality declined, and schooling and higher 
education - especially in the form of community colleges - increased. 
 
 Within the field of the economics of human capital formation, there has long been a 
debate concerning the causal relationship between education and health (with age being the 
most important component of health). Many empirical studies have shown that there is a 
positive correlation between education and health. However, the source of this correlation is 
not clear. It has been suggested that the observed correlation is caused by a third variable that 
is correlated both with education and with health (Grossman and Kaestner, 1997; Grossman, 
2000). The duration of the intergenerational overlap could constitute the elusive variable. 
 
 If the poor in an economy overlap with their children for a shorter time span than do the 
rich, the children of the poor will run out of parental support earlier than the children of the 
rich, and could therefore acquire less human capital even if all children have access to equally 
priced market finance. Thus, rendering the terms under which children from poor families 
can borrow in order to pay for their acquisition of human capital equal to the terms under 
which children from rich families can so borrow may not equalize the investment in human 
capital environment for the two types of children under differential overlapping. 
 
 A low likelihood that a costly human capital formation today will be rewarded by a flow 
of returns tomorrow dampens investment in human capital.  Among the considerations that 
impinge on this likelihood is the risk to life emanating from civil strife. It is less appreciated 
though that the probability that civil strife will occur is negatively affected by the level of 
investment in human capital: people who stand to lose a large quantity of human capital are 
less inclined to resort to violent means of settling disputes and resolving conflicts than people 
who risk only meager quantities of human capital. To the extent that an extended overlap 
entails the formation of a larger quantity of human capital, the duration of the overlap will be 
correlated negatively with the likelihood of civil strife or with the likelihood of brutality. 
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Appendix 
 
 Proof of Proposition 1: We first consider the case where either s  or , and 
then the case where .  
pl< pls >
pls =
 If either ls <  or , that is, the marginal benefit curve intersects the marginal cost 
curve either at its lower portion before the jump (recall Figure 1), or at its upper portion after 
the jump (recall Figure 3), the second term in the right-hand side of (8) is constant. Hence, 
from differentiating both sides of (8) with respect to l:  
p pls >
[ ] ,)(')(''11)(')1( )()(
l
ss
l
sse
r
s
l
se slrslr ∂
∂ϕ=∂
∂ϕ−+ϕ∂
∂− −−−−  
which implies that 
A
se
l
s slr )(')( ϕ=∂
∂ −− , where  
[ ] [ ] .0)(''11)('1 )()( >ϕ−−ϕ+= −−−− se
r
seA slrslr  
Thus, 0>∂
∂
l
s  for both  and .  pls < pls >
 Considering now the case where s , we prove, by contradiction, that ∆  for a 
given . Suppose this is not true so that 
pl= 0>s
0>∆=∆ pll 0≤∆s  for a given ∆ . Since 
, we obtain from (8) that 
0>p∆= ll
pls =
[ ] ),0()()(11 )( δλ+ϕ=ϕ′− −−  sse
r
slr  
where .0)0( ≥δ  Let   and ),(1 llll >∆+= ),(1 pppp llll >∆+= ).(1 ssss ≤∆+=  It then 
follows that s  and hence, after the increases in l and , (8) becomes pl11 < pl
[ ] ).()(11 11)( 11 sser slr ϕ=ϕ′− −−  
But, because )(⋅ϕ  is an increasing and concave function, the following inequality also holds: 
[ ] [ ] ).()0()()(11)(11 1)(1)( 11 s sserser slrslr ϕ≥δλ+ϕ=ϕ′−>ϕ′− −−−−  
The apparent contradiction completes the proof.   
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